display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
| 13160 | To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: A plurality of things can neither be understood nor can exist unless one first understands the thing that is one, that to which the multitude necessarily reduces. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Prop 3) | |
| A reaction: Notice that it is our need to understand which imposes the unity on the multitude. It is not just some random fiction, or a meaningless mechanical act of thought. |
| 13161 | Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: There are substances everywhere in matter, just as points are everywhere in a line. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Clarif) | |
| A reaction: Since Leibniz is unlikely to believe in the reality of the points, we must wonder whether he was really committed to this infinity of substances. The more traditional notion of substance is always called 'substantial form' by Leibniz. |
| 17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
| Full Idea: The concept of identity is central in specifying spatio-temporally broad objects by ostension. Without identity, n acts of ostension merely specify up to n objects. ..But when we affirm identity of object between ostensions, they refer to the same object. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 1) | |
| A reaction: Quine says that there is an induction involved. On the whole, Quine seems to give a better account of identity than Geach or Wiggins can offer. |
| 11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
| Full Idea: We might propound the maxim of the 'identification of indiscernibles': Objects indistinguishable from one another within the terms of a given discourse should be construed as identical for that discourse. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 2) | |
| A reaction: This increasingly strikes me as the correct way to discuss such things. Identity is largely contextual, and two things can be viewed as type-identical for practical purposes (e.g. teaspoons), but distinguished if it is necessary. |