Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Problem of the Soul', 'Meditations' and 'Philebus'

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6 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes]
     Full Idea: My ability clearly and distinctly to understand one thing without another suffices to make me certain that the one thing is different from the other, since they can be separated from each other (at least by God).
     From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.78)
A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is through discourse that the same thing flits around, becoming one and many in all sorts of ways.
     From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15d)
     A reaction: This is not scepticism about wholes on Plato's part, but a reminder of an obvious fact, that in thought we can break the world up and put it back together again. It is a touchstone of the debate, though.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
     Full Idea: The alleged naked, or rather hidden, substance of wax is something that we can neither ourselves conceive nor explain to others.
     From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.31) by Pierre Gassendi - Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) 273
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato]
     Full Idea: Someone can theoretically divide an object into constituent parts, concede that they are one object, and then claim that therefore the one is many and the many are one.
     From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 14e)
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes]
     Full Idea: After taking away what does not belong to the wax, let us see what is left: surely, it is nothing other than a thing that is extended, flexible and changeable.
     From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], (VII:30-1)), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.2
     A reaction: Aristotle worried about nothing being left when you 'stripped' an object, so this could be seen as a positive contribution to scholastic philosophy. Why is the substrate 'flexible'? He talks elsewhere of taking the clothes off the wax and seeing it naked.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog]
     Full Idea: For Descartes in providing an essence for an item [such as God, wax, or a mathematical kind] we provide an encapsulating formula defining the phenomenon.
     From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641]) by Joseph Almog - Nature Without Essence I
     A reaction: I argue that this is not what Aristotle intended be an essentialist definition, which can be quite long, like a scientific monograph. Descartes firmly rejected Aristotle's 'substantial form' as essence.