display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
23466 | Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Objects make up the substance of the world. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.021) | |
A reaction: He doesn't say here that the objects are physical, and may be including Frege's abstract objects. His concept of substance seems more like Spinoza than Aristotle. |
23467 | Objects are simple [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Objects are simple | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.02) | |
A reaction: Presumably all his objects are 'simples', and what we think of as normal objects are counted by LW as 'facts'. |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: If anything is essential to Socrates, surely self-identity is. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.37) | |
A reaction: This is the modern move of Plantinga and Adams, to make 'is identical with Socrates' the one property which assures the identity of Socrates (his 'haecceity'). My view is that self-identity is not a property. Plantinga wonders about that on p.44. |