display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Is the 'new' electron in the lower orbit the one that was in the higher orbit? Physics, as far as I can tell, has nothing to say about this. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14) | |
A reaction: I suspect that physicists would say that philosophers are worrying about such questions because they haven't grasped the new conceptual scheme that emerged in 1926. The poor mutts insist on hanging on to 'objects'. |
17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: If you have rejected the Principle of the Transitivity of (vague) Identity, it is hard to see how the problem of the Ship of Theseus could arise. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18) | |
A reaction: I think this may well be the best solution to the whole problem |
19030 | Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Not every feature of an individual's origin is plausibly considered necessary, so we can distinguish two questions: 'why origin, rather than development?', and 'why these particular features of origin?'. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.2) | |
A reaction: [she cites P. Mackie 1998] The point is that exactly where someone was born doesn't seem vital. If it is nothing more than that every contingent object must have an origin, that is not very exciting. |
19040 | We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The plausibility of the necessity of origin is a symptom of our general tendency to think of possibility in terms of the 'branching model' - that unactualised possibilities must branch off from actuality, at some point. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.9) | |
A reaction: [she cites P. Mackie 1998] It is hard to see how we could flatly deny some possibilities which had absolutely no connection with actuality, and were probably quite unimaginable for us. |