display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: The thesis about composition and parthood that I am advocating has far-reaching ontological consequences: that every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 10) | |
A reaction: A 'simple' is a placeholder for anything considered to be a fundamental unit of existence (such as an electron or a quark). This amazingly sharp distinction strikes me as utterly implausible. There is too much in the middle ground. |
17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Those who believe that the statue is distinct from the lump should concede that whatever shares a part with the statue shares a part with the lump but deny that the statue is a part of the lump. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 05) | |
A reaction: Standard mereology says if they share all their parts then they are the same thing, so it is hard to explain how they are 'distinct'. The distinction is only modal - that they could be separated (by squashing, or by part substitution). |
17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: If you can make a (random) gollyswoggle by accident by kneading clay, then you must be causing the generation and corruption of a series of objects of infinitesimal duration. ...We have not augmented the furniture of the world but only rearranged it. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 13) | |
A reaction: Van Inwagen's final conclusion is a bit crazy, but I am in sympathy with his general scepticism about what sorts of things definitively constitute 'objects'. He overrates simples, and he overrates lives. |
9388 | Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege] |
Full Idea: Of any concept, we must require that it have a sharp boundary. Of any object it must hold either that it falls under the concept or it does not. We may not allow a third case in which it is somehow indeterminate whether an object falls under a concept. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914], p.229), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts p.1 n1 | |
A reaction: This is the voice of the classical logician, which has echoed by Russell. I'm with them, I think, in the sense that logic can only work with precise concepts. The jury is still out. Maybe we can 'precisify', without achieving total precision. |