Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Varieties of Things' and 'Critique of Practical Reason'

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8 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object

15846	In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
	Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts
	From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5
	A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something?

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum

7929	A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: The three main theories of substance are the bundle theory (Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Ayer), the bare substratum theory (Locke and Bergmann), and the essentialist theory.
	From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Macdonald defends the essentialist theory. The essentialist view immediately appeals to me. Properties must be OF something, and the something must have the power to produce properties. So there.

7941	Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: A rival to the bundle theory says that, for each substance, there is a constituent of it that is not a property but is both essential and unique to it, this constituent being referred to as a 'bare particular' or 'substratum'.
	From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: This doesn't sound promising. It is unclear what existence devoid of all properties could be like. How could it 'have' its properties if it was devoid of features (it seems to need property-hooks)? It is an ontological black hole. How do you prove it?

7942	The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: If there is a substratum or bare particular within a substance, this gives an explanation of the unity of substances, and it is something which can survive intact when a substance changes.
	From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: [v. compressed wording] Many problems here. The one that strikes me is that when things change they sometimes lose their unity and identity, and that seems to be decided entirely from observation of properties, not from assessing the substratum.

7943	A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: There seems to be no way of identifying a substratum as the bearer of qualities without qualifiying it as bare (having the property of being bare?), ..and they cannot be used to individuate things, because they are necessarily indiscernible.
	From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: The defence would probably be a priori, claiming an axiomatic necessity for substrata in our thinking about the world, along with a denial that bareness is a property (any more than not being a contemporary of Napoleon is a property).

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects

15849	Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
	Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one.
	From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2
	A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships.

15850	Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
	Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole.
	From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c)
	A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

13259	It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
	Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts.
	From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2
	A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts.