Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology' and 'De Mundo Praesenti'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects

12743	A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In a Being one per se a real union is required consisting not in the situation or motion of parts, as in a chain or a house, but in a unique individual principle and subject of attributes and operations, in us a soul and in a body a substantial form.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1506), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
	A reaction: Leibniz is said not to be an essentialist, by making all properties essential, but he is certainly committed to substance, and it sounds like essence here (or one view of essence), when it makes identity possible. This idea is pure Aristotle.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

21218	The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl]
	Full Idea: It belongs to the sense of anything contingent to have an essence and therefore an Eidos which can be apprehended purely.
	From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.1.002), quoted by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 3.2.2
	A reaction: This is the quirky idea that we can know necessary categorial essences a priori, even if the category is currently empty. Crops us in Lowe. Husserl says grasping the corresponding individuals must be possible. Third Man question.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

19263	Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya]
	Full Idea: Husserl's 'eidetic variation' implies that we can judge the essential properties of an object by varying the properties of the object in imagination, and seeing which vary and which do not.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Anand Vaidya - Understanding and Essence 'Knowledge'
	A reaction: The problem with this is that there are trivial or highly general necessary properties which are obviously not essential to the thing. Vaidya says [822] you can't perform the experiment without prior knowledge of the essence.