display all the ideas for this combination of texts
22 ideas
9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
14960 | Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: A body is that, which having no dependence on our thought, is coincident or coextended with some part of space. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.01) | |
A reaction: This rather Cartesian view doesn't seem to offer any distinction between empty space and space containing an 'object'. Presumably it is the ancestor of the Quinean account just in terms of space-time points. Don't like it. |
17250 | If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: One body cannot be in two places at the same time, ...for the place that a body fills being divided into two, the placed body will also be divided into two; the place and the body that fills that place are divided both together. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.08) | |
A reaction: If every time you manipulated one body it affected both of them, you might say that one body was in two places, rather like a mirror image. |
17249 | If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Two bodies cannot be together in the same place, ..because when a body that fills its whole place is divided into two, the place itself is divided into two also, so that there will be two places. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.08) | |
A reaction: The wonderful things about philosophy is that you are faced with obvious truths of the world, and cannot begin to think why they are true - and then up steps a philosopher and offers you a reason. |
13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
17248 | If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: How can any whole body be moved, unless all its parts be moved together with it? | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.05) | |
A reaction: This might be a distinguishing mark for a whole physical body. I think it is probably the main mark for ordinary folk. I've never found this idea in Aristotle. |
593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
16790 | A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: A body is always the same, whether the parts of it be put together or dispersed; or whether it be congealed or dissolved. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07) | |
A reaction: This appears to be a commitment by Hobbes to what we now call 'classical' mereology - that any bunch of things can count as a whole, whether they are together or dispersed. He seems to mean more than a watch surviving dismantling. |
13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
17244 | To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: In composition, it is to be understood that for the making up of a whole there is no need of putting the parts together, so as to make them touch one another, but only of collecting them into one sum in the mind. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.07.08) | |
A reaction: This seems to the 'unrestricted composition' of classical mereology, since it appears that Hobbes offers no restriction on which parts can be united by a mind, no matter how bizarre. |
11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
17233 | Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Universal things are contained in the nature of singular things. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.04) | |
A reaction: That is the neatest and most accurate summary of the situation I have ever read. Particulars come first, but they are all riddled with generalities (but that is not as well said as Hobbes's remark). |
11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
17246 | Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: There are certain accidents which can never perish except the body perish also. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.03) | |
A reaction: He is just making an observation, and not proposing a theory about essence. |
17251 | The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: That accident for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which denominates its subject, is commonly called the essence thereof. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.23) | |
A reaction: This is clearly a prelude to Locke's more carefully formulated 'nominal essence'. Fairly obvious, for nominalist empiricists. A bit surprising to say this was 'common'. |
17257 | It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: That will be the same river which flows from one and the same fountain, whether the same water, or other water, or something other than water, flow thence. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07) | |
A reaction: This makes the source the one necessity for a river. I think the end matters too. If the Thames reversed direction, and flowed into Wales, it would not be the Thames any more. |
12853 | Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: In the Ship of Theseus, some place individuity in the unity of matter; others, in the unity of form. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07) | |
A reaction: Simons raises this comment into a dogma, that there are at least two objects present in the ship. If I offered you a sum for the contents of your house, they would have a unity of monetary value. |
17256 | If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: If some man kept the old planks as they were taken out, and by putting them afterwards together again in the same order, had again made a ship of them, ...there would have been two ships numerically the same, which is absurd. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07) | |
A reaction: This is the origin of the famous modern problematical example of the Ship of Theseus. The ancient example is just the case of whether you step into the same river, but using an artefact with parts, to make it clearer. |
16794 | As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: It makes a great difference to ask concerning Socrates whether he is the same human being or whether he is the same body. For his body, when he is old, cannot be the same it was when he was an infant. …He can, however, be the same human being. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07) | |
A reaction: This is not commitment to full (Geachian) relative identity, but it notes the problem. |
17255 | Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Two bodies are said to differ from one another, when something may be said of one of them, which cannot be said of the other at the same time. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.02) | |
A reaction: Note the astute addition of 'at the same time'. Note also that it is couched in terms of what is true, rather than in terms of 'properties' or 'accidents'. |