Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'Every Thing Must Go' and 'The Actual and the Virtual'

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7 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross]
     Full Idea: Individual things are constructs built for second-best tracking of real patterns. They are not necessarily linguistic constructions, since some non-human animals almost certainly cognitively construct them.
     From: J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 4.5)
     A reaction: Delighted to see animals making an appearance. Fans of language-based metaphysics please note. If they are fictional constructs, why do they do such a good job of tracking? What generates the 'superficial' appearance that there are objects?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato]
     Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2
     A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3
     A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics.
Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross]
     Full Idea: Scientists have developed principles for understanding individuation in terms of the production of thermodynamic depth.
     From: J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 4.5)
     A reaction: [They cite J.Collier for this view] Interesting, even though I don't really understand 'thermodynamic depth'. Ladyman and Ross reject it, but there is a whiff of a theory of individuation from within physics.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross]
     Full Idea: There is growing convergence among philosophers of physics that physics motivates abandonment of a metaphysics that posits fundamental self-subsistent individuals.
     From: J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 3.4)
     A reaction: They cite fermions as an example, which only seem to be given an identity by the relations into which they enter. It is a bit cheeky to simultaneously offer this idea, and despise van Inwagen and Merricks for the same object nihilism.
There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross]
     Full Idea: There is no single account of what individuals there are because, we argue, the special sciences may disagree about the bounds and status of individuals since they describe the world at different scales.
     From: J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 3.8)
     A reaction: This seems to deny that nature has actual joints, and so seems to me to be a form of anti-realism (which they would deny). Why shouldn't there be a single view which unites all of these special sciences?
There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross]
     Full Idea: At the quantum scale there are no cats; at scales appropriate for astrophysics there are no mountains.
     From: J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 4.2)
     A reaction: I don't find this convincing. Since cats are made of quantised entities, they do exist in that world, but are of little interest when trying to understand it. Similarly, astrophysicists hardly deny the existence of mountains!