10664
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Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack]
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Full Idea:
Complex particulars are of at least three types: masses (which sum, of which we do not ask 'how many?' but 'how much?'); composite individuals (how many?, and summing usually fails); and sets (only divisible one way, unlike composites).
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From:
Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 1)
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A reaction:
A composite pile of grains of sand gradually becomes a mass, and drops of water become 'water everywhere'. A set of people divides into individual humans, but redescribe the elements as the union of males and females?
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13260
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Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all.
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From:
report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2
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A reaction:
[She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle.
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10665
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Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack]
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Full Idea:
We can employ Leibniz's Law against mereological atomism. Water is wet, but no water molecule is wet. The set of infinite numbers is infinite, but no finite number is infinite. ..But with plural reference the atomist can resist this argument.
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From:
Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 1)
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A reaction:
The idea of plural reference is to state plural facts without referring to complex things, which is interesting. The general idea is that we have atomism, and then all the relations, unities, identities etc. are in the facts, not in the things. I like it.
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