Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'The Origin of Forms and Qualities' and 'True to the Facts'

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6 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16034	Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle]
	Full Idea: I understand the word 'form' to mean, not a real substance distinct from matter, but only the matter itself of a natural body, with its peculiar manner of existence [corpuscular structure], which may be called its 'essential modification' or 'stamp'.
	From: Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666], p.324), quoted by Jan-Erik Jones - Real Essence §3
	A reaction: I don't think Aristotle ever thought that a form was separate from its matter, let alone qualifying as a substance. On the whole, Boyle attacks scholastic philosophy, rather than Aristotle.

15953	To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle]
	Full Idea: If it be demanded why rhubarb purges choler, snow dazzles the eyes rather than grass etc., that these effects are performed by substantial forms of the respective bodies is at best but to tell me what is the agent, not how the effect is wrought.
	From: Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666], p.47?), quoted by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 01.2
	A reaction: This is the problem of the 'virtus dormitiva' of opium (which at least tells you it was the opium what done it). I take Aristotle to have aspired to a lot more than this. He wanted a full definition, which would contain lots of information about the form.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object

15846	In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
	Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts
	From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5
	A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something?

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects

15849	Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
	Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one.
	From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2
	A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships.

15850	Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
	Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole.
	From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c)
	A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

13259	It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
	Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts.
	From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2
	A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts.