Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Vagueness and Contradiction' and 'New Essays on Human Understanding'

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6 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
     Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d)
     A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Within each substance there is a perfect bond between the future and the past, which is what creates the identity of the individual.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01)
     A reaction: I'm not quite sure if this means anything, but the idea that a bond across time is a necessity for intrinsic identity is interesting. The 'bond' would, I take it, have to be a causal one.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I maintain that substances (material or immaterial) cannot be conceived in their bare essence devoid of activity; that activity is of the essence of substance in general
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref 65)
     A reaction: Leibniz liked the idea that God was the source of this activity, but this remark makes Leibniz a direct ancestor of modern scientific essentialism.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We find that two shadows or two rays of light interpenetrate, and we could devise an imaginary world where bodies did the same.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.27)
     A reaction: I suspect this is a case of being able to imagine something when you don't fully understand it (like a bonfire on the Moon), but when you fully understand the modern physics of it, you see the necessity of separation between objects.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There are vague and imperfect essences, as in the question of how few hairs a man can have without being bald.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.05)
     A reaction: This example is much discussed in contemporary debate, but I now learn that it has a venerable history. The surprise here is the word 'essences', because I had taken Leibnizian essences to be 'perfect ideas', and hence precise.
An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Sometimes an exclusive 'or' gradually develops into an inclusive 'or'. A restaurant offers 'free coffee or juice'. The customers ask for both, and gradually they are given it, first as a courtesy, and eventually as an expectation.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 7.2)
     A reaction: [compressed] A very nice example - of the rot of vagueness even seeping into the basic logical connectives. We don't have to accept it, though. Each instance of usage of 'or', by manager or customer, might be clearly one or the other.