Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory' and 'Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
     Full Idea: Every man of common sense has a clear and distinct notion of identity. If you ask for a definition of identity, I confess I can give none. It is too simple a notion.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4)
     A reaction: 'Identical' seems to be a two-place predicate, but the only strict way two things can be identical is if there is actually just one thing. In which case just drop the word 'identity' (instead of defining it), and say there is just one thing here.
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
     Full Idea: Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 6)
     A reaction: This doesn't mean that Reid thinks there is nothing more to the identity than their similitude. But he, like Hume, denies that there is personal identity at any given instant. Reid is better at criticism than at formulating his own theory.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
     Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically.