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2 ideas
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
Full Idea: I would define categorical properties as those whose identities depend only on the kinds of structures they represent. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3 n8) | |
A reaction: Aha. So categorical properties would be much more perspicaciously labelled as 'structural' properties. Why does philosophical terminology make it all more difficult than it needs to be? |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
Full Idea: A distinctive set of intrinsic properties for a given kind is called a 'real essence'. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: Note that he thinks essence is a set of properties (rather than what gives rise to the properties), and that it is kinds (and not individuals) which have real essences, and that one role of the properties is to be 'distinctive' of the kind. Cf. Oderberg. |