Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Must We Believe in Set Theory?' and 'Philosophy of Mind'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos]
     Full Idea: I am rather a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence. Smaller numbers, sets and functions don't offend my sense of reality.
     From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.128)
     A reaction: The great Boolos is rather hard to disagree with, but I disagree. Logicians love abstract objects, indeed they would almost be out of a job without them. It seems to me they smuggle them into our ontology by redefining either 'object' or 'exists'.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos]
     Full Idea: We twentieth century city dwellers deal with abstract objects all the time, such as bank balances, radio programs, software, newspaper articles, poems, mistakes, triangles.
     From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.129)
     A reaction: I find this claim to be totally question-begging, and typical of a logician. The word 'object' gets horribly stretched in these discussions. We can create concepts which have all the logical properties of objects. Maybe they just 'subsist'?
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil]
     Full Idea: If a boat can continue to exist after the planks that currently make it up have ceased to exist, and if the planks could continue to exist when the boat does not, then a boat cannot be identified with the planks that make it up at a given time.
     From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This seems obvious, but it opposes Locke's claim that the particles of an object are its identity. Does this mean identities are entirely in our heads, and not a feature of nature? I want to resist that.