|
14496
|
Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
|
|
Full Idea:
The notion of structure or form, far from being a mysterious and causally inert invention of philosophers, lies at the very center of many scientific and other rigorous endeavours, such as mathematics, logic, linguistics, chemistry and music.
|
|
From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro)
|
|
A reaction:
This echoes my own belief exactly, and places Aristotle at the centre of the modern stage. Her list of subjects is intriguing, and will need a bit of thought.
|
|
13279
|
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
|
|
Full Idea:
The view that constitution is identity has many versions: eliminativism (van Inwagen), identity relative to time (Gallois), identity relativized to sort (Geach), four-dimensionalism (Lewis, Sider), contingent identity (Gibbard), dominant kinds (Burke).
|
|
From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.7.2 n17)
|
|
A reaction:
[she offers other names- useful footnote] Eliminativism says there is no identity. Gallois's view is Heraclitus. Geach seems to deny nature, since sorts are partly conventional. 4-D, nah! Gibbard: it could be the thing but lack its identity? Kinds wrong.
|
|
13266
|
Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
|
|
Full Idea:
The modern theory of parts and wholes was intended primarily to replace set theory; in this way, wholes came out looking as much like sets as they possibly could, without set theory's commitment to an infinite hierarchy of abstract objects.
|
|
From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro)
|
|
A reaction:
A very nice clarificatory remark, which explains well this rather baffling phenomenon of people who think there is nothing more to a whole than a pile of parts, as if a scrap heap were the same as a fleet of motor cars.
|
|
14500
|
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
|
|
Full Idea:
A commitment to wholes is a commitment to entities that are numerically distinct from their parts (by Leibniz's Law, they don't share all of their properties - the parts typically exist, but the whole doesn't, prior to its creation).
|
|
From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 3.1)
|
|
A reaction:
Presumably in classical mereology no act of 'creation' is needed, since all the parts in the universe already form all the possible wholes into which they might combine, however bizarrely.
|