Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Principles of Philosophy', 'Clitophon' and 'Commentary on 'Physics''

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5 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

16630	If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Based on perceiving the presence of some attribute, we conclude there must also be present an existing thing or substance to which it can be attributed.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.52), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.1
	A reaction: A rainbow might be a tricky case. This illustrates the persistent belief in substances, even among philosophers who embraced the new corpuscular and mechanistic view of matter.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

5013	A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes]
	Full Idea: By substance we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.51)
	A reaction: Properties, of course, are the things which have dependent existence. Can properties be reduced to substances (e.g. by adopting a materialist theory of mind)? Note that Descartes does not think that substances depend on God for existence.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

16633	A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Each substance has one principal property that constitutes its nature and essence, to which all its other properties are referred. Extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought of thinking substances.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.53), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.3
	A reaction: Property is likely to be 'propria', which is a property distinctive of some thing, not just any old modern property. This is quite a strikingly original view of the nature of essence. Descartes despised 'substantial forms'.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things

16698	Days exist, and yet they seem to be made up of parts which don't exist [Burley]
	Full Idea: I grant that a successive being is composed out of non-beings, as is clear of a day, which is composed of non-entities. Some part of this day is past and some future, and yet this day is.
	From: Walter Burley (Commentary on 'Physics' [1325], III text 11,f.65rb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
	A reaction: The dilemma of Aristotle over time infected the scholastic attempt to give an account of successive entities. A day is a wonderfully elusive entity for a metaphysician.

16690	Unlike permanent things, successive things cannot exist all at once [Burley]
	Full Idea: This is the difference between permanent and successive things: that a permanent thing exists all at once, or at least can exist all at once, whereas it is incompatible with a successive thing to exist all at once.
	From: Walter Burley (Commentary on 'Physics' [1325], III txt 11,f.65rb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1
	A reaction: Permanent things sound like what are now called 'three-dimensional' objects, but scholastic 'entia successiva' are not the same as spacetime 'worms' or collections of temporal stages.