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2 ideas
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
Full Idea: A distinctive set of intrinsic properties for a given kind is called a 'real essence'. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: Note that he thinks essence is a set of properties (rather than what gives rise to the properties), and that it is kinds (and not individuals) which have real essences, and that one role of the properties is to be 'distinctive' of the kind. Cf. Oderberg. |
13129 | Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Essential kinds can be very specific, and arguably too specific for the purposes of ontological categories. | |
From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §27) | |
A reaction: Interesting. There doesn't seem to be any precise guideline as to how specific an essential kind might be. In scientific essentialism, each of the isotopes of tin has a distinct essence, but why should they not be categories |