Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance', 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity' and 'De Corpore (Elements, First Section)'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Universal things are contained in the nature of singular things.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.04)
     A reaction: That is the neatest and most accurate summary of the situation I have ever read. Particulars come first, but they are all riddled with generalities (but that is not as well said as Hobbes's remark).
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: There are certain accidents which can never perish except the body perish also.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.03)
     A reaction: He is just making an observation, and not proposing a theory about essence.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: Essences have normally been understood to be constituted by qualitative properties.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 1)
     A reaction: I add this simple point, because it might be challenged by the view that an essence is a substance, rather than the properties of anything. I prefer that, and would add that substances are individuated by distinctive causal powers.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: That accident for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which denominates its subject, is commonly called the essence thereof.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.23)
     A reaction: This is clearly a prelude to Locke's more carefully formulated 'nominal essence'. Fairly obvious, for nominalist empiricists. A bit surprising to say this was 'common'.