Combining Texts

Ideas for 'De Corpore (Elements, First Section)', 'Causal Powers' and 'De Mundo Praesenti'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
15309 The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: The assumption that shape and solidity are the fundamental mechanical qualities requires an implausible hypothesis of a substance or material filling the space of bodies.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.II.B)
     A reaction: This is 'substance' in the sense of matter, rather than in the sense of an Aristotelian essence. They defend fields (rather than particles) as the fundamentals of the physical world.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
15264 The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: Chemical analysis either arrives at a qualityless substance, the notorious substratum, or is obliged to declare certain qualities primary and inexplicable. Substituting individuals-with-powers for substance-with-qualities removes these difficulties.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.II)
     A reaction: Any account gives you something as basic, and that something is always going to seem inherently and deeply mysterious. I prefer powers to substrata, but what has the powers? They like 'fields'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
16790 A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: A body is always the same, whether the parts of it be put together or dispersed; or whether it be congealed or dissolved.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07)
     A reaction: This appears to be a commitment by Hobbes to what we now call 'classical' mereology - that any bunch of things can count as a whole, whether they are together or dispersed. He seems to mean more than a watch surviving dismantling.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
17244 To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: In composition, it is to be understood that for the making up of a whole there is no need of putting the parts together, so as to make them touch one another, but only of collecting them into one sum in the mind.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.07.08)
     A reaction: This seems to the 'unrestricted composition' of classical mereology, since it appears that Hobbes offers no restriction on which parts can be united by a mind, no matter how bizarre.