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3 ideas
13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Any individual thing must be a thing of some general kind - because, at the very least, it must belong to some ontological category. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2) | |
A reaction: Where does the law that 'everything must have a category' come from? I'm baffled by remarks of this kind. Where do we get the categories from? From observing the individuals. So which has priority? Not the categories. Is God a kind? |
17036 | Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke] |
Full Idea: If the man who invented bifocals was the first Postmaster General of the United States - that they were one and the same - it's contingently true. …So when you make identity statements using descriptions, that can be a contingent fact. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 2) |
17038 | If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke] |
Full Idea: If Hesperus and Phosphorus are one and the same, then in no other possible world can they be different. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 2) | |
A reaction: If we ask whether one object could possibly be two objects, and deny that possibility, then Kripke's novel thought seems just right and obvious. |