Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Roots of Reference', 'Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed)' and 'World and Essence'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
16795 Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
     Full Idea: It is one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the same person, if Person, Man and Substance are three names standing for three different ideas; for such as is the idea belonging to the name, such must be the identity.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.07)
     A reaction: It might be better to say that two things can only be 'the same' in some respect. You can say 'in some respects they are the same', without citing the respects.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
12504 Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke]
     Full Idea: We don't conceive it possible that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place and time...When, therefore, we demand whether any thing be the same or no, it refers to something that existed at a time and place, and was the same with itself.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.01)
     A reaction: I find the notion of 'self-identity' puzzling. I've always taken it to be a logicians' idea, but Locke seems to arrive at it by looking for whatever is identical with some original object, and the floating relation having to hook back onto itself.
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Is there any reason to suppose that 'being identical with Socrates' names a property? Well, is there any reason to suppose that it does not? I cannot think of any, nor have I heard any that are at all impressive.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II)
     A reaction: Is there any reason to think that a planet somewhere is entirely under the control of white mice? Extraordinary. No wonder Plantinga believes in God and the Ontological Argument, as well as the existence of 'Socrateity' etc.