Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Contingent Identity' and 'Categories'
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24 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
16154
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Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
12351
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Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16091
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Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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11280
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Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
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1694
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Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle]
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11040
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A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
16140
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Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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10965
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In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
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11036
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A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
8287
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Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
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12350
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Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064
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If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
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14066
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A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
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14067
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Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
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14069
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We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11039
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A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076
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Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
12361
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Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077
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Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070
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A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
3315
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Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073
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Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065
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Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
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14074
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Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
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