Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Varieties of Things' and 'Individuals without Sortals'

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27 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation

17519

To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location

7961	A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

17511

Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]

17510

Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]

17522

We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]

17515

Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]

7926	We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification

17517

Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

7936	Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

7930	The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique

7932	A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]

7937	When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]

7939	Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]

7940	A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

17513

If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]

7948	A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum

7929	A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C]

7941	Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C]

7942	The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C]

7943	A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

17523

Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

17521

You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]

17514

Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity

17509

Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

17512

If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

7927	At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C]

7928	The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C]