Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' and 'The Laws of Thought'

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18 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle]
Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle]
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]