Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Topics', 'Human, All Too Human' and 'Identity and Essence'
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21 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
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12132
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Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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12280
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Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
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15834
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Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
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12140
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Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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13269
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In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
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12284
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Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
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11895
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A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P]
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12141
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Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
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12137
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De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
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12142
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Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody]
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12143
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An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
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12262
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An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
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12144
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Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
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12139
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Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
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12290
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Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
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12286
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If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
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12135
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Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
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12130
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a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
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12266
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'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
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12287
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Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
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12288
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Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
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