Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Topics', 'Idea for a Universal History' and 'Sameness and Substance'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

28 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
16492 Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
16493 Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
16496 Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
12280 Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
16495 The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
16501 In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
16506 Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13269 In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
12284 Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
16509 Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12262 An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
16514 Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
16510 Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16503 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
16499 A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
16515 A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
16517 Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
12290 Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12286 If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
16498 Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
16497 Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
16502 Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16521 A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
16505 By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
12266 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
12287 Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
12288 Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
16494 We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]