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Ideas for
'Topics', 'Material Beings' and 'Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro'
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28 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
17556
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Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen]
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8264
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Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
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Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen]
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14228
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If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen]
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14468
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Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
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Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen]
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17574
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If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
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I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
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If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen]
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17561
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If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
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I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen]
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We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen]
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13269
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In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
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Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
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An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
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The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
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The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
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When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
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If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
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Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12286
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If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
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'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
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12287
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Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
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Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
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