Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and 'Things and Their Parts'
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14 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
23466
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Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
23467
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Objects are simple [Wittgenstein]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13332
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Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
23468
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Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333
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The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326
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A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
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13327
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A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329
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An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
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13330
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An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328
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Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
22321
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To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
6056
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Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
22322
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You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
6057
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Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]
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