Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'In a Different Voice' and 'Anti-essentialism'
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13 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102
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If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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13103
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Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104
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Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100
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Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068
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We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069
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The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
12764
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For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12761
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An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
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13072
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Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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17080
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Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12763
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Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12762
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Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101
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Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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