Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Mind in Nature' and 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'

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13 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
23466 Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
23467 Objects are simple [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
23468 Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15476 Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
15465 Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
15481 I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15474 Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
22321 To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15486 Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
6056 Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
15475 The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
22322 You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
6057 Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]