Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Are there propositions?', 'Some Remarks on Essentialism' and 'Ordinary Objects'
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15 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
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14487
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The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
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14485
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Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
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21651
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It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
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14486
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Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
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14467
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Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
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14479
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To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
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14481
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Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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14482
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If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
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14483
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Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
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13952
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Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
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13954
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The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
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13955
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Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
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13953
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An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
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14476
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Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
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14477
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Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
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