Combining Texts
Ideas for
'From an Ontological Point of View', 'The Principles of Mathematics' and 'Scientific Explanation'
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13 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
7008
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Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil]
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7018
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Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
7781
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I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
14166
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Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
14164
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The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
14112
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A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
7019
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Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
7046
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Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
7047
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Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil]
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7048
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Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14170
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Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
14107
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Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell]
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11849
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It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell]
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