Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On Liberty', 'The Structure of Objects' and 'Contingent Identity'

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21 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
14495 I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki]
13264 If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
14497 The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki]
13280 Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
14496 Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
13279 There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13283 The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
14498 For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13266 Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
14500 Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
13281 Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]