Combining Texts
Ideas for
'On What Grounds What', 'The Concept of Logical Consequence' and 'In Defense of Essentialism'
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10 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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14193
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'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
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14195
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If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
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14196
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Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
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14198
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Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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13742
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There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
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13752
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The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
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14190
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Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
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14191
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Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
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14192
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Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
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14197
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An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
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