Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Naming and Necessity preface' and 'Essence and Modality'
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15 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082
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No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11152
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Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11161
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Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
11160
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Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
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11158
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Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11167
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Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
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16537
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Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
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11163
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The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
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11164
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It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10935
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An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10936
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Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11165
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If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
16981
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With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081
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Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
4942
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The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
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