Combining Texts
Ideas for
'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Logicism Revisited' and 'Critique of Pure Reason'
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16 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
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5533
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Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant]
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21449
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The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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14193
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'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
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14195
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If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
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14196
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Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
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5550
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A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
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21451
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All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant]
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5564
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Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
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14198
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Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
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14190
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Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
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14191
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Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
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14192
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Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
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14197
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An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
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5626
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An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
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7576
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The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley]
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14509
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If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant]
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