Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Through the Looking Glass', 'The Mind in Nature' and 'How Things Might Have Been'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
17 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
|
11897
|
A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
|
|
11898
|
Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
|
11883
|
A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
|
15476
|
Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
|
|
15465
|
Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
|
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
|
15481
|
I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
|
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
|
15474
|
Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
|
11889
|
Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
|
11877
|
An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
|
|
11882
|
No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
|
|
11886
|
There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
|
11909
|
Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
|
|
11899
|
Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
|
11906
|
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
|
11894
|
Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
|
15486
|
Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
|
|
15475
|
The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
|