Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Why Constitution is not Identity', 'Against Method' and 'World and Essence'
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15 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435
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Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
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The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
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'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker]
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The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
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Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
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Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
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16081
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The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
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16082
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Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
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Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
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Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
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14653
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X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
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If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
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14661
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Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
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Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
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