Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Individuals without Sortals', 'World and Essence' and 'The Bhagavad Gita'
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21 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435
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Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519
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To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
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14655
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The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658
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'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17511
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Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
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17510
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Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
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17522
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We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
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17515
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Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517
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Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513
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If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656
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Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523
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Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14653
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X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
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14660
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If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
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14661
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Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
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14654
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Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521
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You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
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17514
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Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509
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Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512
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If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657
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Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
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