Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Individuals without Sortals', 'Identity and Essence' and 'Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right'
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24 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519
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To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
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12132
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Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510
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Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
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17522
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We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
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17515
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Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
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15834
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Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
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17511
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Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517
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Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513
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If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
12140
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Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11895
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A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P]
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12141
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Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody]
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17523
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Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12137
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De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12142
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Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody]
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12143
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An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
12144
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Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12139
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Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521
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You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
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17514
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Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12135
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Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509
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Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512
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If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
12130
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a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
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