Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Individuals without Sortals', 'The Ethics' and 'Against Liberalism'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
23 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519
|
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
|
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510
|
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
|
17522
|
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
|
17515
|
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
|
17511
|
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517
|
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
17188
|
A thing is unified if its parts produce a single effect [Spinoza]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
5639
|
Spinoza implies that thought is impossible without the notion of substance [Spinoza, by Scruton]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
21857
|
Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord]
|
4813
|
Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza]
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513
|
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
4828
|
The essence of a thing is what is required for it to exist or be conceived [Spinoza]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523
|
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
17187
|
Essence gives existence and conception to things, and is inseparable from them [Spinoza]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
17191
|
Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
17184
|
All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521
|
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
|
17514
|
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
17205
|
Only an external cause can destroy something [Spinoza]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509
|
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512
|
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
17175
|
There cannot be two substances with the same attributes [Spinoza]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
17173
|
Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza]
|