Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'works' and 'Naming and Necessity lectures'

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31 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
17647 Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16995 Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
17047 If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
5450 For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17055 Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
16997 An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
17045 De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
17030 Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
16955 Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
16996 Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13971 Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
12100 An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16991 No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11867 If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
12018 Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
17046 Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
8274 Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
17036 Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
17038 If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]