Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Recent Debates on the A Priori' and 'Person and Object'

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21 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
15810 Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
15805 Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm]
15807 A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
15814 A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
12852 If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15808 A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
12851 Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15806 The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
15826 There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm]