Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Individuals without Sortals', 'The Absurd' and 'Essence and Modality'
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23 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
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17519
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To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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17510
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Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
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17522
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We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
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17515
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Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
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17511
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Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
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17517
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Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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17513
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If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
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11152
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Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
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17523
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Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
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11161
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Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
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11160
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Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
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11158
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Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
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11167
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Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
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16537
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Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
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11163
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The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
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11164
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It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
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10935
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An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
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10936
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Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
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17521
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You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
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17514
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Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
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11165
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If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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17509
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Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
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17512
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If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
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