Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Frege philosophy of mathematics', 'Person and Object' and 'Reality without Reference'
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16 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
9885
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The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
9858
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Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett]
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9859
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It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett]
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9860
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'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
9872
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Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
15810
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Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
15805
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Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm]
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15807
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A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
15814
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A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
12852
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If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15808
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A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
12851
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Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
9848
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Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett]
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9842
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Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15806
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The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
15826
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There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm]
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