Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Frege philosophy of mathematics' and 'Essential Attribution'
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13 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
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9885
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The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
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9858
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Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett]
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9859
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It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett]
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9860
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'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
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9872
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Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
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11181
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Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
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11184
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Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
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11180
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Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
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11186
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'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
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11185
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'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
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11182
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If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
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9848
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Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett]
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9842
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Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett]
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