Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Identity and Essence' and 'Letters to Des Bosses'
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22 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
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12132
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Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody]
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12775
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Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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15834
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Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
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15851
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Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
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12776
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Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
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12140
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Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
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15846
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In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
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15849
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Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
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15850
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Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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13259
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It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
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11895
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A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P]
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12141
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Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
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12753
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A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
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12137
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De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
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12142
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Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody]
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12143
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An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
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12144
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Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
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12781
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A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
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12139
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Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
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12135
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Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
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15847
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Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
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12130
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a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
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