Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Protagoras', 'New Essays on Human Understanding' and 'How Things Might Have Been'
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16 ideas
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
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11889
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Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
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12931
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Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
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12811
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We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
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11877
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An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
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11882
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No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
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11886
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There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
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12981
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Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
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11909
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Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
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11899
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Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
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5057
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If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
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11906
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The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
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12987
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For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
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12884
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The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
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12975
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We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
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12805
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If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
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12806
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Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
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