Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Causal Powers' and 'Content Preservation'
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19 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
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15272
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The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
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15851
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Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
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15304
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We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
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15309
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The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
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15846
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In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
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15264
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The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
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15849
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Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
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15850
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Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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13259
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It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
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15262
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In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
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15297
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We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
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15266
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We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
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15220
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To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden]
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15222
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Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden]
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15296
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A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
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15275
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'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
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15271
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If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
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15256
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Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
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15847
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Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
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